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HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
GOTTLOB FREGE'S PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 
ECKEHART KOHLER 
Dept. of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588 
The frontiers of mathematics lie in two directions: higher towards more 
and more sophisticated and complicated constructions based on accepted 
principles and methods; and lower towards deeper and deeper foundations of 
the superstructure of accepted mathematics. Frege was a great pioneer on the 
latter frontier and single-handedly opened up a deep and rich area of research 
from which mathematicians and philosophers still profit. In this paper I will 
describe Frege's contributions to the foundations of number theory and 
analysis and then discuss the tenability of his program. 
In a nutshell, Frege's principle goal was to reduce mathematics to logic. 
His greatest obstacle lay in the weakness of the logical systems prevalent in 
his day, consisting as they did mainly of syllogistics and smatterings of 
propositional and modal logics. Clearly, logic as conceived in his day was 
inadequate for treating mathematics, as it did not even include an adequate 
theory of relations and quantification. So Frege built up a modern and 
precise logic which to this day serves as a standard of thoroughness and 
precision. How this logic may be described relative to mathematics is a 
problem I will discuss after I describe how Frege reduced natural numbers 
and real numbers to the concepts of his logical system. 
Frege's approach to understanding the concept of number differed from 
that of Cantor and Weierstrass mainly because he defined numbers explicitly 
in terms of their roles in measurement. A natural number was defined 
explicitly as that which all things of the same cardinal measure have in 
common; a real number was defined explicitly as that which all magnitudes 
have in common which have the same measure relative to their respective 
units of measurement. 
What is a system of measurement in general? It is a (relational) structure 
held in common by all sets of objects which can be given a similar assignment 
of numbers. The basis A/for a measurement system is a relational system 
describing a set of objects A/in terms of certain relations R 1, ... , Rn. 
Therefore we say 
A = <A, R 1, ... , Rn> is a relational system 
iff A is a domain of objects over which the mi-place 
relations Ri are defined. 
Now the essential step in setting up the system of measurement is to find 
another relational system where A consists of numbers with the same 
structure as A. An example would be N = < N,~, + >, the relational system 
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wlwSc domain N is the natural numbers and whose relations are 'not larger 
than' and 'plus'. Then we may say that A is measured by N iff there is an 
3ssi~i1ment of numbers from N to each object a/in A designated by 'f(a)' such 
that if a, a', a"E A, R(a,a') iff f(a) ~ f(a'), and R'(a,a',a") iff f(a) + f(a') = 
[(a"). where Rand R' are two of the relations among R 1,,,., Rn and all the 
oth~r relations among them are defineable in terms of Rand R'. 
In the case of natural numbers, the measurement system is absolute, 
becallse any given set of objects can only have one cardinal number. In the 
case of real numbers, however, the measurement is relative to the unit of 
measurement applied. Hence Frege defined real numbers as sets of relations 
between units of measurement and magnitudes of objects measured, and he 
wouid say for instance that the relation between the standard meter and Wilt 
Chamberlain's height is the same as, e.g. the relation between the standard 
unit for electrical current and the amount of current the generator of my car 
puts uut (both approximately 2). 
Frege's method therefore went exactly according to modern measure-
ment theory: he defined the relational structures which natural and real 
numbers have, he introduced sets of objects whose existence is logically 
certain and then showed that they satisfy those structures and can hence be 
used as numbers. First let us see how Frege characterized the relational 
structure of natural numbers in his monographs Begriffschrift (J 879) and 
Grund/agen der Arithmetik (1884), which came n.b. prior to the publications 
of Dedekind and Peano. There are five axioms for this structure, given in 
modern notation as follows: 
I. 0 E N (the progression is non-empty) 
2. x E N ~ Sex) E N (each member has a successor) 
3. x EN -+ Sex) 1= 0 (one member (zero) has no predecessor) 
4. [x,y EN i\ Sex) = S(y)] -+ x = y (no branches among predecessors) 
5. [P(O) i\ (Y)((YE N i\ P(y)) -+ P(S(y)))] -+ (x)(x EN -+ P(x)) 
(principle of induction for progressions) 
And to show how natural number theory is reducible to purely logical 
notions, Frege gave the following definitions for the two basic notions 0 and 
S in the Grundlagen as follows: first define [x] as the cardinal number of x in 
terms of one-to-one mappings f. Then let the cardinal number [x] be the 
equivalence class of x whereby f is the equivalence relation used; formally, 
Y E [x] .. (z) (z E y" f( z) € x). 
The Justification for this procedure is that counting takes place by comparing 
members of a set to be counted one for one with members of a set whose 
number we already know, this comparison being carried out by using the 
one-lo-one mapping f. Now the first number, zero, may be defined with 
reference to the null set, for we know this set has no members. Furthermore, 
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we know that, if cardinal numbers up to n are defined, the n+ I-tuple 
containing those numbers and also zero must have cardinality n + I 
which permits the definition of the successor function S. Formally, we hav: 
o =df [A] ; letting g(n) = <0, ... ,n>, we say 
Sen) =df [g(n)]. 
For example, if we take n = 1, we define 2 = S(l) by using the fact that <0, I), 
contains two elements by logical necessity. 
F rege characterized the relational structure of real numbers in the 
second volume of his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik as follows (again in 
modern notation): 
1. x> 0 A x = 0 V -x> 0 .. X € Rd (definition of the set of real magnitudes 
relative to the universal null magnitude) 
2. x - x = 0 (definition of the null magnitude) 
3. x-:Fx -(irreflexivityof » 
4. x,y > 0 .. x + Y > y V x = y V Y > x .. (E x) (y > z A ~ P (z») .. x € Re 
(the least upper bound of any bounded property of magnitudes is a 
magnitude) 
7. x> 0 .. (Ey) (x > y > 0) (there are arbitrarily small magnitudes) 
Again, Frege intended to define the fundamental notions of real magnitude 
theory in purely logical terms, find purely logical concepts, i.e. concepts 
whose existence is provable from logic alone, which have the structure of real 
magnitudes, and then define real numbers as relations between the magni-
tudes. This program was interrupted at the end of Grundgesetze II by 
Russell's discovery of a paradox in set theory, to which Frege's theory of 
concepts was subject. Nevertheless, we see that Frege intended to proceed in 
real number theory quite analogously to his method with natural numbers, 
viz. by a direct involvement of measurement theory. Even so, he was still able 
to derive many well-known properties of real magnitudes from his axioms, 
such as Archimedes' Law, the associativity and the commutativity of 
audition, etc. 
Now the question arises in what sense Frege can be considered to have 
been successful in reducing mathematics to logic. Frege's thesis encountered 
two difficulties, the first concerning the adequacy of his proofs, the second 
concerning whether his premises were really entirely logical and not covertly 
mathematical after all. As it turns out, both difficulties are closely tied 
together. 
As is well known, all set theories and theories of concepts and properties 
were shown to contain vexing contradictions by Bertrand Russell in 1902. In 
this year he wrote his famous letter to Frege describing the antinomy now 
called by his name and showing how Frege's sytem in the Grundgesetze was 
inconsistent. Unbeknownst to Russell, Cantor had earlier discovered for 
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JJiJ11~" 1 f, revealed only to Dedekind, a related antinomy now called Cantor's 
par,icil1X which generated contradictions as efficiently as Russell's paradox. 
B(:L':111,e Frege's system also contained all these paradoxes, it may be 
C()n~iuJed that he did indeed fail to derive mathematics from logic in a strict 
sell'''. [JilL it must be noted that in the same sense, all nineteenth century 
[lons of mathematics failed, including the famous reductions of 
Car, i'd, Dedekind and Weierstrass of analysis to arithmetic, as these 
red''''; tons all relied essentially on an unsound set theory. Of course this fact 
was Jl,~ver used against the reduction of analysis to arithmetic even though it 
wa" used frequently against the attempted reduction by Frege of arithmetic 
tLl set theory. In this unfair manner Frege's career and reputation suffered, 
whc:! ~as those of the other reductionists did not. 
On the other hand, as various apparently consistent set theories had been 
developed later on and applied to the foundation of mathematics, it turned 
Llut that the methods of introducing numbers required little modification 
compared to their original application in the contradictory set theories. 
Hence the reductions of Frege must also be regarded as successful insofar as 
they are easily adaptable to modern, apparently consistent set theories. It is 
unfortunate that Frege suffered the brunt of the hysteria at the time 
concerning the paradoxes mainly because he made himself more prominent 
thruugh his rigor, whereas those such as Cantor and Dedekind who had not 
axiomatized their set theory as precisely as Frege managed to elude attack 
through vagueness. 
In the course of the development of set theories such as Russell's type 
theory, the classic systems of Zermelo, Fraenkel, von Neumann, Gadel and 
Quine, the combinatory systems of Curry and Fitch, etc" etc., the view 
became more predominant that these set theories were not really logical at 
alL due to the extent to which apparently non-logical and sometimes vary ad 
hoc steps were taken to avoid paradoxes and yet still have a set theory strong 
enough for mathematical application. This was despite the fact that set 
theory is clearly an extensional theory of concepts and is intimately 
connected with traditionally logical and ontological problems reaching back 
into antiquity. Theories of concepts and terms, whether intensional or 
extensional, have always been reckoned to logic. One argument in favor of 
the new view was that a multiplicity of conf1icting set theories had evolved, 
on which no general agreement could be made and where there seemed to be 
no consensus of intuitive conviction. This allegedly contrasts with the 
situation in logic, which was allegedly monolithic and relied on widespread 
agreement about axioms. But merely to state the latter is to evoke rebuttal, 
for in all branches of logic, conf1icting systems with uncertain intuitive bases 
vie with each other. 
Another popular argument is that set theory is not logical because it 
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deals with concepts of infinity and hence must belong to mathematics. 
However, it turns out that the notion of infinity is definable and can be 
discussed even in terms of the weakest notions in logic, viz. that of the 
subsumption of one property under another. Even in terms of purely 
nominalistic logic, which is weaker still, having only the relation of part to 
whole, many statements about infinity may be made. Consequently, this 
argument fails. 
One of the more usual recent arguments against placing set theory in 
logic is that the two fields differ very much in terms of methodology: 
quantification theory of predicate logic is complete, whereas even weak set 
theories are not. But then second order logic is already not complete and 
hence should be reckoned to mathematics (misnomer or no). (Strictly 
speaking, second order logic is one of the weakest set theories.) Are second 
order and higher order logics not parts of logic? Where can a line be drawn? Is 
the operation of abstraction or hypostasis, that classically logical notion on 
whose basis the higher order logics are generated, no longer to be considered 
logical? 
The most sensible solution and the one to which I subscribe is to declare 
mathematics and logic to be identical. There is much to recommend this view 
besides the accidental fact that by far the most work being done in logic 
nowadays is coming out of mathematics departments. On the one hand, 
mathematics has long since ceased to be identified exclusively with number 
theories and geometry, having long ago branched out into abstract algebra 
and topology, which strictly speaking belong to the logic of relations. On the 
other hand, logic has also ceased to be identified with the trivial, tautological 
disciplines of syllogistics and propositional logics and has long since taken the 
clearly intuitive connection between the notions of predicate, concept and set 
and made them the major research areas. 
Hence my conclusion is that, of the three schools concerning the 
foundations of mathematics, that of Frege is the least problematic and stands 
on the firmest basis. Hilbert's program of formalism has undergone such 
drastic changes since the publication of the proofs of Gbdel and Church as to 
render it unrecognizable and hardly distinguishable from "logicism." 
Intuitionism is still a minority movement of a highly sectarian nature which, 
although it elicits the interest and sympathy of many mathematicians is still 
considered too restrictive. Of course, it must be admitted that "logicism," 
which is what Frege's approach is called today, can no longer be maintained 
with respect to any monolithic and universally accepted doctrine of logical 
truth in the present-day situation of pluralism and tolerance. But such an idea 
was really no more tenable in Frege's day than it is now; and yet there is still 
more to say in favor of the unity of logic and mathematics today than 
heretofore. 
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